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Thinking the Unthinkable
Presidential Directive 59
BY

Water Simson

The Cold War has put our thinking in the deep
freeze. And now the cynical manipulations of the
presidential campaign, with all its militaristic
bravado, have left us talking more about war than
peace.
In this context it is not surprising that there
has been little criticism of Presidential Directive
59, the Carter administration's shift to a new and
hawkish strategic nuclear weapons doctrine.
Tragically, while this new doctrine was ostensibly
formulated to enhance our nation's security, it will
have precisely the opposite effect.
What is the new nuclear doctrine?
Four components can be identified. First, there
is "counterforce," a plan for targeting nuclear
weapons at Soviet military forces (such as missile
silos) instead of only at population and industrial
centers (as past policy presumably did).
Second, there are the nuclear weapons which make
counterforce possible: a new generation of highly
accdrate, multi-billion dollar missile systems,
including the MX, Trident II, and Cruise missiles.
Third, there is the adoption of "launch on warning,"
a plan to launch nuclear weapons prior to actually
being struck by enemy forces.
Finally, the new Carter doctrine includes
preparations to wage so-called "limited nuclear
wars," where nuclear weapons would be used
"selectively" but presumably without instigating an
all-out nuclear holocaust.
Following the lead of the press, I've called the
doctrine codified by P.D. 59 new. But in a sense, it
is not new at all. While in the past inadequate
weapons technology has made its implementation

problematic,

for nearly ten years the Pentagon has

had a plan for 'Tlexible strategic options" on the
drawing board. Nor is this doctrine likely to
disappear with the demise of the Carter
Administration. We can expect President-elect Ronald
Reagan to embrace this nuclear war-fighting doctrine
even more whole-heartedly than Jimmy Carter did.

1hus, even if new Soviet missiles could wipe out
our land-based missile force, our government would
still have over 6,000 hydrogen bombs to retaliate
with. This is the sum total of all Soviet warheads.
It represents enough explosive power to destroy every
major city on earth, surely a sufficient deterrent to
Soviet attack.
-Under certain circumstances, counterforce
targeting and the new missiles that accompany it are
more likely to start a nuclear war than to deter one.
The salient feature of weapons like the MX
missile is their extreme accuracy. This accuracy,
when coupled with counterforce targeting, will give
the United States the ability to disarm Soviet
missiles in their blast-hardened protective silos.
This may seem advantageous, but in the Strangelovian
logic of nuclear weapons, it is not.
Unlike the United States, most of the Soviet
deterrent is comprised of warheads on vulnerable
land-based missiles. Thus, counterforce weaponry
(which threatens these missiles) strikes at the very
heart of Soviet defenses. This vulnerability is
destabilizing to the fragile balance of power.
In a tense conflict situation where war between
the superpowers seemed likely, the threat posed by
counterforce could actually give the Russians cause
to attack first. Having little confidence in their
ability to deter an American attack, the Russians
might conclude that they had nothing to lose by
attacking first themselves.
Given the massive U.S. retaliation that would
necessarily follow,
Soviet leaders could have no
illusions about winning such a war. Their only
comfort would be that they went down fighting and
destroyed our country too.
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Tl StrategiNucl Wons
United States-SoieUno

7000f
us

It is important to note that this doctrine was
not publicly debated before its adoption. Rather we
are asked to have faith and simply accept it. Let me
explain why this doctrine must be rejected.
-The new strategic doctrine is premised on the
totally unwarranted assumption that advances in
Soviet missile technology are rendering our deterrent
ineffective. But two-thirds of the United States'
10,000 strategic nuclear warheads are on sea-based
missiles carried by a fleet of nuclear submarines.
These subs are invulnerable:
they cannot be
effectively detected, tracked, or targeted.
Paize fourteen
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Thinking the Unthinkable...

-If history tells us anything, it is that the
Soviets will not accept a position of inferiority
with regard to nuclear weapons. Thus, in response to
U.S. development of weapons like the MX, we can
expect the Soviet Union to further augment their
burgeoning nuclear arsenal and to seek to match our
country's technological virtuosity with more accurate
missiles of their own.
By intensifying the threat against "them," we
invite a greater threat against ourselves. By upping
the ante, we encourage reciprocal insanity. In the
process of pursuing mutual bankruptcy, both nations
will become less secure and more fearful of surprise
attacks.
-The fear of a preemptive first strike against
vulnerable land-based missiles has given rise to the
perceived need to adopt a "launch on warning" policy.
However, this procedure is viewed with terror in
other parts of the world. It vastly increases the
chances of an accidental nuclear war.
On three separate occasions during the last year
US. nuclear war forces were alerted and readied for
immediate action. These alerts occurred when an
early warning device malfunctioned and mistakenly
indicated that a Soviet attack was under way. That.
such' mistakes can be made is perhaps the strongest
against "launch on warning."
argument
Our early warning systems are not infallible;
the equipment can break down and the humans operating
and monitoring it can err. If we want to avoid
nuclear war, we should not accept a doctrine that
puts our nuclear forces on a hair trigger.
-Arms control experts on both sides generally
agree that nuclear war between the superpowers
probably cannot be kept limited. As it takes only
15-30 minutes for nuclear-tipped missiles to reach
their targets, a limited nuclear strike would exert
tremendous pressure for a quick response.
The conflict could escalate quickly as neither
side would want to risk being caught "on the ground"
by the other's missiles. Besides, Soviet policy
explicitly calls for massive retaliation in response
to any American nuclear attack, whether limited or
not.
The very idea of a limited nuclear war is
preposterous. A recent article in Scientific
American garnered evidence to show that even if a
nuclear exchange were entirely limited to military
targets, the incredible destructiveness of nuclear
weap=os Would result in an unprecedented loss of life
for the civilian population anyway. It is inaccurate
to call such a war "limited:"
The doctrine of "limited nuclear war" is
designed to cloak facts such as these. It is a
scandalous attempt to give legitimacy to the use of
nuclear weapons, to render "thinkable' what ought to
remain forever unthinkable.
frall 1980

What is striking about the current debate, or
is the failure to perceive an
lack of it,
alternative. We have been backed into a corner by
hawks and false patriots in both the Carter and
Reagan camps. These short-sighted individuals raise
the tired spectre of a Soviet surprise attack and
tell us that the only thing we can do is to escalate
the arms race to a higher, more dangerous level We
must reject such counsel.
While we deplore many of their political
practices, the Russians are not reckless when it
comes to nuclear weapons. They do not want another
war on their soil, especially a nuclear one. We can
and must pursue peace with them
The choice before us is clear. We can act
irrationally, up the ante, and ultimately increase
the chances of nuclear war. Or we can seek genuine
security by taking steps toward the control and
eventual elimination of nuclear weapons from the
earth.
I submit that the latter alternative is
preferable and could be pursued in three ways.
First, by ratifying SALT II or some similar document
reaffirming detente. Second, by negotiating a
bilateral "freeze" on new weapons which would stay in
effect while a step-by-step plan for maintaining
parity through the disarmament process was worked
out. Third, by shifting to an energy policy that
rejects nuclear power, thus providing global
leadership to prevent the spread of nuclear
technology and weapons capability to other countries.
Such proposals may seem risky or Utopian, but at
least they offer us an alternative to the selfdestructive course we are on now.

Admittedly, the climate in Washington for the
kind of alternative I outline is not good. While themargin of Ronald Reagan's victory should not be
construed as a mandate for his hawkish politics (I
doubt that Reagan won the election because of his
platform), it is these politics he will attempt to
put into effect. SALT II has already been scrapped
and we can expect drastic increases in military
expenditures, including funds for the new strategic
nuclear weapons which function as the backbone of
P.D. 59.
In light of these events, is there any hope?
While no definitive answer can be given to such
a question, I think that there is hope, but only if
those who love life and are committed to peace speak
out now. No one can save the world, but together we
0
stand a chance.

For more information on how you can help to
reverse the arms race, contact the Western New York
Peace Center, 440 Leroy Avenue, Buffalo, New York.
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